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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUPERVISORY AND
MANAGERIAL DEFINITIONS IN THE ILLINOIS
EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
AND THE PUBLIC LABOR
RELATIONS ACT OF ILLINOIS
GILBERT A. CORNFIELD, ESQ.*
THE "SUPERVISORY" AND "MANAGERIAL" EXCLUSIONS OF THE
ILLINOIS ACTS
In 1983, the Illinois General Assembly enacted two significant
pieces of legislation which address public employee collective bargain-
ing; the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act ("IELRA"), and the
Public Labor Relations Act of Illinois ("PLRA"). These Acts follow a
pattern set by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the National La-
bor Relations Act in dividing the work force between supervisory em-
ployees, who are "unprotected" by the Acts' provisions, and other
employees who are "protected."1
The IELRA effective January 1, 1984, covers all public educa-
tional systems and institutions in the State.2 The IELRA exempts "su-
pervisors" from the Act's coverage. A supervisor is defined as:
[A]ny individual having authority in the interests of the employer to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward or
discipline other employees within the appropriate bargaining unit
and adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend such action
if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature but requires the use of independent judgment. The term 'su-
pervisor' includes only those individuals who devote a preponder-
ance of their employment time to such exercising authority.r
The IELRA also exempts "managerial employees" in addition to
supervisors. The distinction made in the legislation between these two
exempt classes follows a history of decisionmaking by the National La-
bor Relations Board ("NLRB") and recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in applying the supervisory exclusion of
Taft-Hartley.
* B.A., J.D., University of Chicago. Mr Cornfield is a partner with the law firm of Corn-
field and Feldman, Chicago, Illinois.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982). The definition of "supervisor" is at § 152(11).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1701 (1984).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1702(g) (1984).
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In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company,4 the Supreme Court of the
United States sustained the NLRB's decision to include managerial
employees within the concept of excluded supervisory personnel,
although such employees may not have a direct command responsibil-
ity for personnel within an enterprise's structure. The Supreme Court
held that the Board, therefore, was within its statutory authority in re-
moving this additional class of employees from the coverage of the La-
bor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA", the generally used title of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by Taft-Hartley). In
1980, the Court applied its BellAerospace categorization of managerial
employees in NLRB v. Yeshiva University5 to a private university's
faculty by excluding the faculty from the coverage of the LMRA on the
basis of their collective extensive control over the curriculum and aca-
demic affairs of the institution.
Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court decisions, the IELRA
specifically exempts managerial employees, as well as supervisors. The
IELRA defines a managerial employee as:
[A]n individual who is engaged predominantly in executive and
management functions and is charged with the responsibility of di-
recting the effectuation of such management policies and practices. 6
The PLRA, effective July 1, 1984, covers most public employees in
the State, aside from those in public education, police and fire person-
nel, and those in small units of government. 7 The PLRA also divides
the work force between supervisors and managerial employees on the
one hand, and other employees, on the other.
The PLRA exempts supervisors from the Act's coverage, defining
this class of employees in a similar fashion as the IELRA:
"Supervisor" is an employee whose principal work is substan-
tially different from that of his subordinates and who has authority,
in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, re-
call, promote, discharge, direct, reward, or discipline employees, or
to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend such action, if
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the consistent use of independent judgment. The
term "supervisor" includes only those individuals who devote a pre-
ponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority
State supervisors notwithstanding.8
The exempted managerial employee under the PLRA is defined as:
4. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
5. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1702(o) (1984).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1601-1627 (1984).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1603(q) (1984).
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[A]n individual who is engaged predominantly in executive and
management functions and is charged with the responsibility of di-
recting the effectuation of such management policies and practices. 9
Both the IELRA and the PLRA contain qualifications in the defi-
nitions of supervisor which demonstrate the intent to limit the scope of
the exclusion as compared to the definition in the LMRA. The Taft-
Hartley Amendments defined a supervisor as:
[Any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, re-
ward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action,
if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.'°
The LMRA lists the indicia of supervisory status. The NLRB has
consistently held that if an employee, in the course of the employee's
usual work, performs in only one of the supervisory functions specified
in the statutory definition of supervisor, the individual is excluded from
coverage. 1' The IELRA does not include within the definition the au-
thority to "direct" employees and, most significantly, includes "only
those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment
time" to exercising the supervisory authority set forth in the Act.' 2
The PLRA also underscores the requirement that the supervisory
exemption was intended to be applied to a more limited class of em-
ployees than in the private sector under the LMRA. The PLRA con-
tains the same limitation as the IELRA to those "who devote a
preponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority."
Additionally, the PLRA contains the proscription that a supervisor's
principal work must be "substantially different from that of his subor-
dinates."' 13 This caveat in the Act may be seen as a cautionary signal to
the fact that the PLRA does include "direct" among the list of indicia
of supervisory status.
The IELRA and PLRA definitions of managerial employee are
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1603(j) (1984).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 152(1 1) (1982).
II. NLRB v. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 335 U.S. 908 (1948).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1702(g) (1984) (emphasis added).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 16 03(q) (1984) (emphasis added). There is also the ambiguous
reference in the definition to "State supervisors notwithstanding". We need not dwell upon this
qualification given the subject matter of this paper. A fair interpretation of the qualification is the
intent not to include State employees having the word "supervisor" in their civil service title as,
therefore, being automatically excluded "supervisors" within the meaning of the PLRA. As an
example, employees holding titles within the Mental Health Supervisor civil service series would
unlikely exercise significant authority over personnel or meet the "preponderance of their employ-
ment time" requirement.
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identical. It is less clear than in the case of supervisors whether the
Governor and the legislature intended to depart from the private sec-
tor. There is no statutory definition for managerial employees in the
LMRA, nor a set definition established by the NLRA. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority in BellAerospace, noted, with approval, prior
Board decisions referring to managerial employees as those who "for-
mulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making
operative the decisions of their employer."' 4  The Board and the
Supreme Court did not limit "management policies" to personnel mat-
ters. Justice Powell cited NLRB decisions defining employees as mana-
gerial because they are more closely identified with those of
management or representatives of management, although their work
did not generally entail the supervision of bargaining unit employees.' 5
It is fair to say that the language with respect to managerial em-
ployees in the IELRA and the PLRA is partially a pickup from NLRB
decisions and the definitions employed by Justice Powell. Given that
assumption, it is also reasonable to conclude that the Illinois Acts in-
tend to avoid administrative decisions which would exclude any sizea-
ble group of employees. The Acts require, as in the case of supervisors,
that a person be predominantly engaged in executive and management
functions and charged with directing the effectuation of management
policies and practices. The Illinois Acts, by emphasizing the quantity
and quality of management functions, appear to specifically focus their
exclusion on those persons who are at or near the top of an administra-
tive pyramid, rather than excluding employees based upon a perception
that they have interests identical with the interests of those in control. ' 6
The simplest way of viewing the supervisory and managerial ex-
clusions of the Illinois Acts is to assume that they represent a political
14. Justice Powell noted, in this regard, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d
37 (7th Cir. 1969); Continental Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 727 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 396
U.S. 902 (1969); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1017 (1966); International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1964); and NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1961).
15. Id at 285-86. Justice Powell cited various NLRB decisions, including those excluding
buyers and assistant buyers, from coverage following the passage of Taft-Hartley. See Denver
Dry Goods, 74 N.L.R.B. 1167 (1947); and Denton's Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35 (1949).
16. Both the IELRA and PLRA exclude "confidential employees" from the Acts' coverage.
This paper does not specifically address this group of employees. Note that the exclusion relates
to functions in connection with "management policies with regard to labor relations." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, § 1603(c) (1984) [PLRA]; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1702(n) (1984) [IELRA]. The
definition for "confidential employees", by referring to management only "with regard to labor
relations" supports the view that the legislative intent was to restrict the "managerial" exclusion
only to those generally in control of personnel policies.
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compromise between a so-called pro-employer interest to limit the
number of employees guaranteed collective bargaining and the right to
strike and organized labor's interest in maximizing the number.' 7 Ac-
cording to that logic, the supporters of labor were required to accept
the Taft-Hartley supervisory amendments, but were successful in nar-
rowing the breadth of the exemption. The contrary view is advanced
that the public's general interest is co-existent with that of the em-
ployer's; that those parts of the Acts which strengthen labor's ability to
engage in collective action result inevitably in a dimunition of public
services and higher taxes to pay for increased wages. This view may
accept the right to collective bargaining in principle, but it equates the
public with the employer when one addresses labor relations in the
17. There is little reported legislative history with respect to the supervisory and managerial
exclusions. In the Senate discussions of May 27, 1983, of Senate Bill 536 (the PLRA) prior to the
Governor's amendatory veto, supervisory employees were not exempt from coverage but were
required to be in separate bargaining units from non supervisory personnel. The following ex-
change from the transcript of Senate proceedings of that date is instructive:
SENATOR KEATS:
[Tihis bill states that supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel may not be joined
in the same bargaining unit, why is that?
SENATOR COLLINS:
Because we could not arrive at agreeable language and so we did as the Federal
Government that allowed them to be organized as a separate body . . . . To avoid
conflict of interest.
SENATOR KEATS:
By this same token, would the board, in your estimation, act by rule to prevent
unions representing supervisors from also representing nonsupervisory personnel?
SENATOR COLLINS:
No, because I think. . . the intent is that they would be one separate unit. . . . If
the language need tightening up to make certain that. . . it doesn't happen, we will...
tighten up the language.
Pages 301-02, May 27, 1983, Transcript of Senate proceedings. Following the Governor's amend-
atory veto of SB 536 and HB 1530, excluding supervisory and managerial personnel, the following
exchange took place in the Senate:
SENATOR LUFT:
Managerial employee, the definition, is it determined by his title or by the role of
the individual?
SENATOR BRUCE:
On . . . managerial employees, Senator Luft, I believe the Governor in . . . his
definition made it very clear that it is . . . not the title. It is the question of the prepon-
derance of time that the employee will spend in the question of management, and those
people who would be excluded from management are only those people who would be
limited to what is known as the central management team. So, I would believe that...
it is not the title.
SENATOR LUFT:
Okay. As a managerial employee, is that normally the central management team?
SENATOR BRUCE:
I believe that we will be using NLRA decisions, the National Labor Relations Act,
[which] have very narrowly defined managerial employees, and I believe that that will be
here. . . that that function of management would be limited to and kept within a central
management team. We're not talking about excluding everyone, just those very limited
people who are central management, at the very highest level.
Transcript of Senate Proceedings, Reel Two, on House Bill 1530, Lines 77-117, November 2, 1983.
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public sector.18
CIVIL SERVICE-A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO CATEGORIZING
EMPLOYEES
The supervisory and managerial exemptions are founded upon a
premise that there are divided loyalties within the work force. Statuto-
rily exempting certain classes of employees from any collective bar-
gaining rights strengthens employee loyalty beyond the immediate
work force, dividing employees in all work forces into two basic
classes-the "employer" and the "employed". Collective conduct and
goals are deemed appropriate only for one group. This distinction is of
a different order than legislative or administrative decisions which sep-
arate employees by appropriate bargaining units or even require super-
visors to be in different local labor organizations than those employees
over whom they have direct or indirect authority.' 9
The division of the work force in the private sector into two classes
was mandated by Congress with the Taft-Hartley Amendments. The
history of labor relations in industry prior to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act and the period between the Wagner Act of 1935 and the Taft-
Hartley Amendments does not include any significant events in the
public sector. Legislation addressing the working conditions of govern-
ment employees in the twentieth century was not in response to or de-
fined in terms of inherently divergent interests between employer and
employee classes. Reform legislation at the turn of the century in Illi-
nois and elsewhere was adopted to constrain perceived conflict between
the public and its employees, on the one side, and the interests of polit-
ical professionals and party organizations. The idea behind civil ser-
vice systems was to immunize practically all of a government's
employees from political favoritism, and award merit and efficiency.
With that goal in mind, civil service legislation in Illinois followed a
very different approach to employee exemptions from collective bar-
18. The Report of Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, GERR RF-I, 51:101,
published March, 1970, strongly recommended that the states draw a distinct line between super-
visory and managerial employees from the rank-and-file in legislating collective bargaining rights
"in order to protect the position of public employers." Then Mayor Lugar dissented from the
majority position because of the preexisting community of interest among "supervisors and pro-
fessional workers . . . with the rank and file they supervise." 51:104-105.
19. Police Ass'ns v. Barrett, I I l L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2728 (N.D. Ga. 1982), upholding the con-
stitutionality of a county resolution prohibiting police sergeants from being in the same local labor
organization as the patrolmen for collective bargaining purposes. The court confirmed that the
two groups of employees could belong to the same local fraternal order of police as long as the
organization did not aspire to be a bargaining representative. See also Elk Grove Firefighters v.
Willis, 539 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1976).
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gaining than did the recent public employee collective bargaining
legislation.
The employees of the State of Illinois have been and remain sub-
ject to the Personnel Code,20 the civil service system for most of the
employees under the Governor's executive authority. The comparable
provisions for supervisory and managerial exemptions are contained in
the "general and partial exemptions" sections of the Code.2' The rele-
vant provision of the "general exemption" excludes from civil service
coverage:
Directors of Departments, the Adjutant General, the Assistant
Adjutant General, the Director of the State Emergency Services and
Disaster Agency, members of boards and commissions, and all other
positions appointed by and with the consent of the Senate. 22
In the "partial exemption" section, one or two private secretaries and
one confidential assistant to each of the individuals excluded in the
"general exemption" are excluded from coverage. Also excluded are
the resident administrative head of each State charitable, penal and
correctional institution.23
The State's optional civil service system, which may be adopted by
local governmental units, contains similar limited exemptions. 24 The
key provision of the Municipal Code exempts from collective bargain-
ing the heads of any principal department of the municipality, the chief
librarian of the public library, police officers above the grade of cap-
tain, a health officer, one private secretary of each of the elected munic-
ipal officials and the municipal manager, and administrative assistants
to the mayor or municipal manager.25
The supervisory and managerial exemptions in the University
Civil Service System 26 for the State's colleges and universities are re-
strictive. Principal administrative employees of each institution and
agency as determined by the Merit Board, a civil service commission,
are exempted. 27
The legislatures early aim of reducing conflict between govern-
ment employees and political organzations, and the public's interest be-
hind civil service reform, were supported by the Illinois Supreme
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 63b101-63bl18 (1983).
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 63b104c, 104d (1983).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 63b104c(7) (1983).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 63b104d(l)(2) (1983).
24. Municipal Code, Article 10, Division 1, Civil Service in Cities, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
7 10-1-1 to -48 (1983).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 10-1-17 (1983).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 241/, 38b.l-38(m) (1983).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 241/, 38b4(3) (1983).
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Court. In Akin v. Kivley,28 the court validated the civil service legisla-
tion, and rejected the idea that public officials could create a myriad of
departments or principal administrators and, thereby, increase the
number of exempt employees. The court was concerned with limiting
the power of elected officers and political parties to utilize their control
over public employment in contravention to the public's interest in
merit and efficiency. The opinion of the supreme court, in relevant
part, observed:
The construction thus contended for would prevent the fulfill-
ment of the object contemplated by the act itself. If it be once held,
that there can be other "heads of any principal department" than
those existing in the ordinances at the time the act was passed, then
new "heads" may from time to time be created by the common coun-
cil, or the appointing officers; and every foreman, who has a squad of
men at work under him, will be considered the head of a department.
The object of the law is to provide for appointment to office upon the
basis of merit and fitness, as ascertained by competitive examinations
which are open and free to all. But if the doctrine is to prevail, that
new heads of any prinicpal department may be created whenever the
exigencies of politics or the demands of partisan service require it,
appointments upon the basis of merit and fitness will soon cease to be
made.29
In the years that followed, the Illinois courts allowed some erosion of
the strict merit concept. Illustrative are cases from the City of Chicago,
sanctioning the creation of new exempt positions through the establish-
ment of additional departments and the transfer of work functions
from classified job titles to exempt personnel. 30
This paper does not attempt to evaluate whether civil service in
Illinois has actually worked as envisioned. The system certainly did
not attempt to address the economic concerns of public employees.
Rather, the paper looks at the historical antecedents to collective bar-
gaining with respect to supervisory personnel within the conceptual
framework that developed prior to passage of the IELRA and the
PLRA and still exists.
Civil service legislation characteristically has frequently attempted
to deal not only with the classification, selection and promotion of em-
ployees, but also with an objective procedure for handling employee
complaints and grievances. This point is interesting in that a grievance
procedure within a civil service system may require the interaction of
28. 171 I11. 44, 49 N.E. 229 (1898).
29. Id at 81-82, 49 N.E. at 241-42.
30. Plotke v. Lower, 236 I11. 608, 86 N.E. 577 (1908); Charles v. Wilson, 52 I11. App.2d 14, 201
N.E.2d 627 (1964).
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classified personnel at different stages of the complaint process. Such
procedures do not contemplate that divided loyalties exist between em-
ployees in the supervisory and subordinate positions, although all are a
part of the same system. Even the question of such employees being
part of the same labor or employee protective organization appears
only to have been challenged when the prospect of collective bargain-
ing appears.3'
An example of a grievance procedure within a civil service system
is the one which has been in place for the State's employees, as man-
dated by the Personnel Code.32 The Personnel Rules for classified
State employees have provided for a four step procedure by which the
complaining employee presents a grievance. First, it is presented to the
immediate supervisor, then to the next higher supervisor. In step 3, the
employee first reaches an exempt supervisor, the head of the operating
agency, 33 if the grievance remains unresolved.
Civil service systems, as they relate to standards for the classifica-
tion, selection and advancement of employees, still exist for state em-
ployees and within the public educational systems for non-academic
personnel. The Collective Bargaining Acts did not supplant civil
service. 34
PRE-TAFT-HARTLEY: A LESS STRATIFIED VIEW OF THE WORK
FORCE
The Wagner Act was borne on the winds, or more accurately, the
31. Police Ass'ns v. Barrett, Il1 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2728 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Elk Grove Firefight-
ers v. Willis, 539 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1976). As a matter of constitutional law, public employees,
regardless of their employment status, unlike private sector employees excluded from the LMRA,
enjoy the right of free association, including labor organizations. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); American Federation of State,
County & Mun. Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969).
32. The Personnel Code directs the Director of Central Management Services (formerly the
Director of Personnel) to establish "a plan for resolving employee grievances and complaints,
excluding compulsory arbitration." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, $ 63b108c(l) (1983).
33. Personnel Rules of the Department of Central Management Services, Subpart A: Griev-
ance Procedure, 80 Ill. Admin. Code ch. I, § 303.
34. The IELRA and PLRA contain provisions that collective bargaining may "supplement,
implement, or relate to the effect of. . .provisions in other laws [relating to hours, wages and
working conditions]." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1607 (1984) [PLRA]. A similar provision is in the
IELRA, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1710(b) (1984). Governmental bodies other than state govern-
ment and education may be "home rule units" under the Constitution of the State of Illinois with
the authority to adopt, revoke or modify a civil service system. Local and county governments
which are not home rule units may or may not have adopted civil service, as provided by state
statutes. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6. See Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill.2d 523, 343 N.E. 2d
919, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976), affirming right of municipality to modify, by ordinance, its
civil service system, at variance with the provisions of the state statute, adopted by the municipal-
ity prior to the adoption in 1970 of the new Illinois Constitution.
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flames of economic and social conflict. Much of the turmoil preceding
passage of the NLRA centered on overt economic and, at times, physi-
cal battles between employers in the private sector and those who were
employed or sought jobs. The preamble to the Wagner Act recited the
need for legislation to legitimize and protect collective bargaining in
response to "strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest" be-
cause of the "denial by employers of the right of employees to organ-
ize." The preamble asserted that collective bargaining would provide
two fundamental benefits for workers: (1) the opportunity for equality
of bargaining power with employers who are organized in the corpo-
rate or other forms of ownership association; and (2) protecting their
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing.35
Clyde Summers has stressed that one of the primary goals of the
Wagner Act was to democratize the workplace. The preamble to the
Act reflects a legislative intent to translate the established institutions of
a democratic political state to the workplaces of the industrial age. 36
During the twelve years between the Wagner Act and Taft-Hart-
ley, the NLRB drew distinctions between supervisory (including mana-
gerial) personnel and other employees. However, this categorization of
employees by the NLRB was principally in the context of unit determi-
nations. One of the primary functions of the NLRB has been the
designation of appropriate bargaining units as part of the process of
conducting representation elections and certifying an exclusive repre-
sentative for a defined group of employees. The Boards under the
IELRA and PLRA have the same authority within their jurisdictions as
the NLRB.37
The NLRB, during the Wagner Act era, had developed a policy of
placing supervisory personnel in separate bargaining units, while ex-
tending to them the Act's protection. The landmark decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Packard Motor Car Company v.
NLRB,38 in 1947, is a benchmark between the Wagner and Taft-Hart-
ley eras. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of
the NLRB that general foremen and foremen of a major auto manufac-
35. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
36. Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, & Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 9 (1982). Professor Summers cites extensively from the legislative history of the
Wagner Act, including Senator Wagner's arguments in favor of his bill as a vehicle for imple-
menting the important policy of providing democracy in the workplace.
37. National Labor Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976) [NLRAJ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, § 1609 (1984) [PLRA]; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1708 (1984) [IELRA].
38. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
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turer were "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA and entitled
to a representation election to select a bargaining representative. 39
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority in Packard Motor Car,
held that the Wagner Act made no exception to the definition of "em-
ployee" which could justify the exclusion of a class of employees from
coverage. Justice Jackson went on to criticize the employer's efforts as
contrary to policies underlying the Act. The Justice rejected the argu-
ment that the work force should be divided by a strict line of competing
loyalties:
Even those who act for the employer in some matters, including
the service of standing between management and manual labor, still
have interests of their own as employees. Though the foreman is the
faithful representative of the employer in maintaining a production
schedule, his interest properly may be adverse to that of the employer
when it comes to fixing his own wages, hours, seniority rights or
working conditions. He does not lose his right to serve himself in
these respects because he serves his master in others. And we see no
basis in this Act whatever for holding that foremen are forbidden the
protection of the Act when they take collective action to protect their
collective interests.
The company's argument is really addressed to the undesirabil-
ity of permitting foremen to organize. It wants selfless representa-
tives of its interest. It fears that if foremen combine to bargain
advantages for themselves, they will sometimes be governed by inter-
ests of their own or of their fellow foremen, rather than by the com-
pany's interest. There is nothing new in this argument. It is rooted
in the misconception that because the employer has the right to
wholehearted loyalty in the performance of the contract of employ-
ment, the employee does not have the right to protect his independ-
ent and adverse interest in the terms of the contract itself and the
conditions of work. But the effect of the National Labor Relations
Act is otherwise, and it is for Congress, not for us, to create
exceptions. 40
Justice Douglas' dissent in Packard Motor Car was based upon a
different view of congressional history. The dissent contended that
Congress had not considered the question of bargaining rights for su-
pervision and, therefore, policy judgments should be deferred to the
legislative body. Justice Douglas, by extensive footnoting of law re-
view articles and philosophical works, noted that his disagreement with
the majority is not on the basis of policy since much could be said to
39. The United Automobile Workers, CIO (UAW) was the bargaining representative for the
"rank and file workmen". The ratio of the UAW bargaining unit to the group sought to be repre-
sented by the Foremen's Association was approximately 32-1. This figure includes "assistant fore-
men" and "special assignment men" (troubleshooters) who may not have been "supervisors", as
that term was defined in Taft-Hartley.
40. 330 U.S. at 489-90.
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support the majority view.4' Although he would deny foremen cover-
age under the Wagner Act, Justice Douglas reassured the foremen that
irrespective of his position, the dissent does not mean that foremen
have no right to organize for collective bargaining. And some states
have placed administrative machinery and sanctions behind that
right.42
TAFT-HARTLEY-LEGISLATING DIVIDED LOYALTIES
Packard Motor Car was a major stimulus to passage of Taft-Hart-
ley.43 The amendments to the NLRA directly evolved from the defini-
tions of supervisors which had been used by the NLRB in treating unit
determinations, as the basis for defining those employees to be ex-
cluded under the Act in the future.44
The division of the work force imposed by Congress was reflected
in the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the preamble of the NLRA. The
prior references to policies favoring freedom of association by workers
was eliminated. The new preamble delineates three groups, each of
which should "recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in
their relations with each other." The three distinct groups are employ-
ers, employees, and labor organizations.45
Following Packard Motor Car and the enactment of Taft-Hartley,
the next most significant development in the law to reinforce stratifica-
tion within the work force was NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company in
1974.46 Justice Powell, for the majority, stressed the congressional con-
cern in 1947 that there had been a weakening of employer loyalty
brought on by the blurring of an appropriate line between management
and labor by the earlier decisions of the NLRB. In turn, it had been
decided that the lack of a clear distinction within the work force had
affected industrial output and efficiency. Justice Powell's reference to
policy considerations and their impact upon production had come full
circle from the policies described by Justice Jackson a generation ear-
lier. Justice Powell cited Congress' rejection of Packard Motor Car and
the policy premises of the majority opinion:
41. Id at 500.
42. Id at 500-01.
43. For a discussion covering the congressional response to Packard Motor Car in a recent
article, see Ashlock, The Bargaining Status of College and University Professors Under the National
Labor Relations Laws, 35 LAB. L.J. 103 (1984); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 279
(1974).
44. See, e.g., L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 298 (1946).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1975).
46. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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Significantly, both the House Report and the Senate Report
voiced concern over the Board's broad reading of the term "em-
ployee" to include those clearly within the managerial hierarchy.
Focusing on Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Packard, the Senate Re-
port specifically mentioned that even vice presidents might be union-
ized under the Board's decision. It is also noted that unionization of
supervisors had hurt productivity, increased the accident rate, upset
the balance of power in collective bargaining, and tended to blur the
line between management and labor. The House Report echoed the
concern for reduction of industrial output and noted that unioniza-
tion of supervisors had deprived employers of the loyal representa-
tions to which they were entitled. And in criticizing the Board's
expansive reading of the Act's definition of the term "employees,"
the House Report noted that "[wihen Congress passed the Labor Act,
we were concerned, as we said in its preamble, with the welfare of
'workers' and 'wage earners,' not of the boss."' 47
The division of the work force following Taft-Hartley has been rein-
forced by other key decisions of the NLRB and the Supreme Court of
the United States.
Shortly after the enactment of Taft-Hartley, the NLRB held that it
is sufficient that an individual possess a single indicium of supervisory
status, including only the authority "responsibly to direct" other em-
ployees, to be exempted from coverage of the Act.48
The fact that a "supervisor" may also perform work functions that
are not managerial does not change the individual's exempt status. The
employer may be obligated to negotiate with a certified or recognized
bargaining representative concerning the transfer of work functions
from the bargaining unit to supervisory personnel; but, may not be
compelled to reach agreement. 49
The Supreme Court's decision in 1974 in Beasley v. Food Fair,
Inc.50 unequivocally invalidated Justice Douglas' observation in the
Packard Motor Car dissent that supervisors under the Wagner Act had
reserved rights to participate in labor organizations or seek protection
under state laws. A unanimous Court concluded that the Taft-Hartley
Amendments had preempted the right of state legislatures to pass or
enforce protective labor legislation for supervisors and, presumably,
managerial employees in the private sector. 51
47. Id at 281-82 (citing H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1947) (footnotes
omitted)).
48. NLRB v. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 335 U.S. 908 (1948); Ohio
Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 338 U.S. 900 (1949).
49. Kendall College, 228 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1977); Lutheran Homes of Kendallville, 267
N.L.R.B. 525 (1982).
50. 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
51. See also Florida Power & Light v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790 (1974), holding it not to be a
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In recent years, the Supreme Court has held that a supervisor re-
mains unprotected by the LMRA if dismissed from employment be-
cause of union membership or support of a labor organization. The
fact that the employer's action was motivated as a demonstration to the
rank-and-file that the employer opposed unionization of all the work
force does not afford protection.52
THE EFFECTS OF THE SUPERVISORY AND MANAGERIAL EXCLUSIONS
IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The effects of the division of the work force since Taft-Hartley has
received little public attention following 1947 and has not been a mat-
ter of general political debate. There are certain broad conclusions
which are apparent. For those opposed to collective bargaining within
our economic system or the growth of labor organizations, then legisla-
tion which enables employers to reserve part of its work force from
protected organizing activity, negotiations and concerted economic and
political activity is in a positive direction.
One would assume that the proponents of unionization oppose the
exclusion of supervisors or managerial employees from protected labor
activities. Nevertheless, this aspect of Taft-Hartley has not been in the
forefront of labor's political efforts in Congress since 1947. It is difficult
to determine whether labor's lack of initiative in this regard is a result
of assessment of political realities or ambivalence toward organizing
those who have been part of a different class within the private sector
work force as compared to those who constitute the predominant mem-
bership of unions. It appears that the reality of this unprotected part of
the work force is most keenly felt by labor when faced with an em-
ployer's threat or ability to maintain operations in the face of an eco-
nomic strike.
Apart from the direct impact of the exclusions embodied in Taft-
Hartley on labor relations, one may speculate to what extent there has
been an effect upon industrial organization and the culture of the soci-
ety, in general. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not regularly pub-
lish data on the number or ratio of supervisors, or other personnel
violation of Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the LMRA for a union to fine a supervisor-member for crossing
a picket line.
52. See Operating Engineers v. Jones, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3272 (1983); Parker-Robb Chev-
rolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 402 (1982); Automobile Salesmen's Union v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). See also Brod, The NLRB Changes Its Policy On The Legality of an Employer's Dis-
charge ofa Disloyal Supervisor, 34 LAB. L.J. 13 (1983).
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excluded by the LMRA by enterprise or industry. 53
There are important questions which are not generally considered:
(1) would the cost of management and supervision have followed a dif-
ferent curve if the Taft-Hartley exclusions had not been adopted; and
(2) would private concerns have continued to develop pyramidical or-
ganizations with multiple levels of management to administer the work
force, or would there have been a thrust toward a minimum of expert
supervision? One encounters few private operations with collective
bargaining agreements that do not provide a higher salary for the front
line supervisor than the top negotiated wage rate for the rank and file
under them. It follows that the salary for the lowest supervisor in the
pyramid becomes the base from which the ascending order of manage-
ment is compensated.
The cost of supervision is compounded by the fact that in organ-
ized industries a line is usually drawn between bargaining unit work
and supervision. Except in the crafts, the era of the working foreman
in industry which existed prior to Taft-Hartley is vanishing. The first
line supervisor may now be a low level young executive who is likely to
be inexperienced in the work functions of those that he supervises.
It is even more difficult to ascertain the extent to which the line
drawn between those inherently loyal to the employer and those for
which collective action was deemed to be appropriate has permeated
members of the work force's view of their own relative worth and sta-
tus, whether or not organized. It is arguable that groups of employees
reject unionization because their self-esteem is threatened, regardless of
their actual or relative economic and social condition in the society.
Within the last ten years, we are witnessing a growing concern that
the structure of the work force that has developed in the post Taft-
Hartley era is impeding industrial efficiency and the American ability
to compete in the marketplace. Much of that concern centers upon the
collective bargaining system and the legal framework established under
the Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley. The supervisory-rank-and-file di-
chotomy built into the LMRA has direct implications to changes taking
place in the structure of the work force. One approach has been to
attempt to accommodate the collective bargaining process to a less rig-
idly divided work force. The other is in the direction of expanding the
53. Unpublished employee census data has placed the ratio of "exempt personnel" to those
covered by collective bargaining agreements, in one of the largest corporations in the country, at
one to four.
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relative number of employees who are exempted from coverage under
the LMRA, utilizing the "managerial" classification.
The first approach aims to foster management and labor joint
decisionmaking in the productive process through various forms of
committees or representative bodies drawn from different elements
within the total work force of an enterprise. The legal problem with
engineering this approach has been the restrictions of the LMRA
against employer interference with worker organizations and the defi-
nition of supervisor in the LMRA. In 1959, the Supreme Court of the
United States in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Company,54 held it was viola-
tive of the Act for an employer to establish employee committees of
union eligible personnel to review work practices and conditions. 55
In 1978, Congress passed the Labor-Management Cooperation Act
as an amendment to the LMRA.5 6 The stated purpose of the Act was
to provide a mechanism by which employers and workers could engage
in joint efforts in "achieving organizational effectiveness" and "to en-
courage free collective bargaining." Joint committees organized by
employers and labor organizations representing employees in a particu-
lar plant, area, or industry are sanctioned and may receive support and
financial assistance from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice. The Service is prohibited from assisting any joint group which is
found "to have as one of its purposes the discouragement of the exer-
cise of rights contained in Section 7 of the [NLRA], or the interference
with collective bargaining in any plant, or industry. ' 57
The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva University58
reflects the other approach. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in a
5-4 decision, reasoned that the commitment of the faculty at a private
university to their professional calling was so intertwined with the basic
54. 360 U.S. 203 (1959). Cf. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d
288 (6th Cir. 1982), rejecting the NLRB's determination that an employer organized in-plant com-
mittee to obtain employee attitudes concerning working conditions was violative of the LMRA.
The Sixth Circuit held that inasmuch as the membership of the committee rotated, it was not
really a representative body, but direct communications with the employees, an allowable action
by an employer under § 185(b)(2) of the Act.
55. § 158(a)(2) of the LMRA subjects an employer to an unfair labor practice "to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization." For discussion of the
interplay between the legal constraints of the LMRA and worker participation in traditional
"management" decisionmaking, see Behrens & Sollenberger, The National Labor Relations Act: .4
Potential Legal Constraint Upon Quality Circles and Other Employer-Sponsored Employee Commit-
tees, 34 LAB. L.J. 776 (1983); Nowak, Worker Participation and Its Potential Application in the
United States, 35 LAB. L.J. 148 (1984).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 173, 175a, 186 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
57. Id.
58. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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purposes of the employing institution that their loyalties must be as-
sessed as fundamentally managerial in nature. Citing the Court's early
decision in NLRB v. BellAerospace Company, the majority concluded,
therefore, that the entire faculty of the university was excluded from
coverage under the LMRA under the supervisory exclusion, rather
than included pursuant to the definition of "professional" in the Act.59
Under the Yeshiva approach, the closer there is a convergence
within an enterprise between the services offered or sold and the em-
ployees providing the service, the more likely the employees can fall
within the managerial exemption. This result is most likely when the
employees are determined to have the characteristics of "profession-
als". The more enterprises are geared to providing services rather than
industrial output, and the more enterprises rely upon persons having
received academic training, the greater the percent of the work force
which will likely fall into the managerial exclusion. 60 In a sense,
Yeshiva represents a full circle back to the Wagner Act, with a different
result. Professor Summers articulates the view that it is unfortunate
that the vision of the Wagner Act-greater democratization of the
workplace through collective bargaining-has not been achieved. In
Yeshiva, because the workplace was found to be saturated with em-
ployee participation and decisionmaking, the employees are exempted
from the protections and rights provided by legislation.
THE FUTURE FOR THE SUPERVISORY AND MANAGERIAL EXCLUSIONS
UNDER THE IELRA AND PLRA
The definitions for "supervisor" and "managerial employee" in
the Illinois Acts were drawn to avoid State administrative and judicial
rulings which might parallel the decisions of the NLRB and the
Supreme Court of the United States. The concepts of supervisory and
managerial exclusions were accepted, but the definitions carefully
drafted to limit the number in a work force who would qualify for the
exception.
The civil service systems which preceded the IELRA and PLRA
provided a framework by which employees, through promotional ex-
amination, experience and training, could advance from jobs with no
59. § 152(12) of the LMRA defines the term "professional employee", an included employee
under the LMRA, but entitled to the option of selecting a separate bargaining unit and representa-
tive from other employees. Similar provisions are contained in the IELRA and PLRA, at
§ 1603(1) and § 1702(k), respectively.
60. For a criticism of the Yeshiva University decision, see Gray, Managerial Employees and
the IndustrialAnalogy." NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 33 LAB. L.J. 390 (1982).
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supervisory responsibilities to the higher echelons of management.
There is no line in that system above which positions are characterized
as inherently loyal to the employer. They are all public servants.
Whether or not civil service has actually worked free of political inter-
ference, based upon merit and produced efficiency is another question.
The structure of civil service exists and will likely be less subject to
political influence in the selection and promotion of employees with the
intervention of a collective bargaining representative. 61
The definitions of "supervisor" and "managerial employee" in the
IELRA has particular significance to academic institutions, in light of
Yeshiva. The requirement that an individual be devoted predomi-
nantly to supervising or major policy functions effectively eliminates
the possibility that any of the teaching faculty would be excluded from
a bargaining unit.
Similarly, the restrictive language in both Acts works against ad-
ministrative decisions by the Boards under the IELRA and PLRA that
would tend to equate the exercise of professional discretion with ex-
empt managerial functions. A typical part of state and local govern-
ment operations in which there is a continuing and substantial
interaction between professional, technical, and other classes of em-
ployees is in institutions devoted to health care.
There are also many situations in the public sector in the State
where the working foreman still functions, particularly in work associ-
ated with the crafts and labor, dealing with building maintenance,
street repair, and parks and recreational areas. A comparable situation
exists in many of the larger institutions for corrections and mental
health where many individuals perform work functions, routinely,
while having some supervisory responsibilities over other employees;
for example, correctional officers (various classifications of prison
guards) and mental health technicians (employees directly concerned
with the housing, food, and recreation of mental patients). It is un-
likely that any of these employees would be denied coverage under
61. The Illinois Acts protect covered "employees" from employer retaliation in response to
employee "concerted activities" that are work related. This guarantee has been basic in all collec-
tive bargaining legislation since the Wagner Act. Although public employees enjoy the additional
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association, those employees who are excluded from the
Illinois Acts as supervisors or managers may be significantly more restricted in the exercise of such
rights in light of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Connick v. Myers, 103
S.Ct. 1684 (1983). The Supreme Court held that a public employee was subject to dismissal for
soliciting involvement of other employees concerning work assignments in a local state district
attorney's office. The Supreme Court held that the issue of work assignments for the lawyers in
the office was not of sufficient public concern to override the elected officer's right to control
employee conduct which is viewed as fostering disharmony and inefficiency.
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either Act, either because of the absence of directing other employees
among the indicia of a supervisor under the IELRA or the requirement
that employees be principally devoted to supervisory or managerial
activities.
The significant question is what will be the response of the princi-
pal executives and administrators and the governing bodies of govern-
ment to the Acts. A substantial number of professionals and employees
with administrative responsibilities among the present work force in
governmental units and in public education do not spend a predomi-
nant amount or preponderance of their employment time solely exer-
cising supervisory functions or with exercising the responsibility of
directing the effectuation of management policies, as delineated in the
Acts. Will there be the tendency to accept the present makeup of the
work force within a collective bargaining system, or will there be an
increase in the number of personnel who perform functions that fit
within the statutory definitions of a supervisor or managerial em-
ployee? If the latter portends the future, then one can also expect that
the salary base for the exempt class will be at a point above the highest
rate negotiated in the collective bargaining agreement for those who
are supervised or managed.
A different future is more likely. Given the limited resources of
state and local government and the restricted supervisory and manage-
rial exceptions allowed by the Illinois Acts, it is more reasonable to
predict that the effect of the new laws should be to reduce inclinations
toward growth in bureaucracies which resemble pyramids.

